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ELEC1RONIC CONTRACTS: ARE THEY ENFORCEABLE? 
by 
Diana D'Amico Juettner* and Roy J. Girasa 
Introduction 
The use of the Internet by consumers has increased dramatically since 1995. In 
June of 1995, there were less than 1.5 million users; however, one year later the number 
of users had grown to 20 million. The increase in the number of users has contributed to 
the growth of business to consumer sales on the Internet. By 1998, approximately 10 
million households purchased a product online and the volume of sales was around $66.4 
billion. The volume of sales for 1999 has been estimated at $66.4 billion with sales 
reaching $177.7 billion by 2003.1 This phenomenon has propelled the use of electronic 
contracts by those who provide computer-generated goods and services to those who wish 
to take advantage of the new technology. This expansion of electronic commerce is 
compelling changes in contract law. 
There are two types of contracts that can be entered into online. The first type 
concerns the delivery of products or services outside the computer system, while the 
second type relates to subject matter that resides within one or more computer systems. 
These agreements, contracted for and performed· online, are created through the use of 
electronic agents. Currently, contracts that relate to products deliverable outside the 
computer may be covered by the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) while contracts that 
are completed totally by computer may not be covered. The major issue is whether 
computer contracts should be governed by the UCC or by some other uniform statute.2 
Other important issues that must be addressed include: whether an electronic contract 
satisfies the Statute of Frauds; whether the writing can be authenticated; and the validity 
of the use of digital signatures. 
In this paper, we will consider: (1) the Statute of Frauds, authentication of the 
writing, and the use of digital signatures; (2) applicability of the UCC to electronic 
contracts, (3) Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act (UCITA), (4) the 
Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act of 2000, (5) the potential 
impact of the passage of these statutes on electronic contracts, and (6) Shrink-Wrap 
and Click Wrap licenses. 
*Professor of Law and Program Director for Legal Studies, Mercy College, Dobbs Ferry, 
New York. E-mail: djuettner@mercynet.edu 
*Professor of Law and Program Chair, Department of Legal Studies & Taxation, Lubin 
School of Business, Pace University, Pleasantville, N.Y.10570. Email: rgirasa@pace.edu. 
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Contracts Formed on the Internet 
Our initial inquiries are: Whether electronic contracts are writings that satisfy the 
requirements of the Statute of Frauds? Can the writings be authenticated? Can the 
alteration of the document by the parties after it is executed be determined and prevented? 
What is the validity of the electronic signature to a contract? 
Authentication & Electronic Signatures 
There are justified concerns that sophisticated users may be able to change on-
screen contracts and allege that the altered agreements are the real agreements entered 
into by the parties be relied upon. Encryption devices can be used to protect the integrity 
of the contents of a document and its signature. 
What constitutes a "signature" has been broadly interpreted by many courts to 
encompass typed signatures, letterheads, indecipherable scribbling, and pre-printed 
signatures.3 It can be argued that electronic signatures may be more reliable rather than 
encompassing an impediment to the fulfillment of the Statute of Frauds. The use of 
encryption devices may provide greater security than one's written signature. Such 
devices would permit both the sender and receiver of a transmission to possess private 
numeric keys known only to them. Thus they would be able to authenticate the 
transmission without fear of a third party intrusion.4 
Digital signatures permit the verification of the authenticity of a document sent 
through the Internet. Digital signatures operate in electronic commerce the way written 
signatures operate on typed documents. Neither can disown the signature absence proof 
of forgery. Digital signatures require use of two keys, one private and one public. The 
keys are issued by a Certification Authority [CA]. The private key is for the sender and 
messages are decrypted with the public key. A sender who signs a document with the 
private key can have his/her signature confirmed by use of the public key. 
A document is initially created as, e.g., a word document, which is sent to digital 
signature software to be processed. The processing or coding is done by means of a 
sender performing a mathematical computation on his document ("hash function"), which 
generates a string of code called a message digest. The message digest is based on the 
specific content of the original document so that any changes would give a different 
message digest. The algorithm may, e.g., create or count the number of letters or 
characters between two specific letters in the document. The hash function or result is 
exhibited as a series of numbers. 
The sender encrypts the message digest with his private key, which is a password 
or number known by the sender only, attaches his signature to the end of the documents 
thereby signing it by means of a second algorithm, and sends it to the receiver. The 
receiver having access to the public key may now verify the sender's identity and 
integrity of the document. The signature is decrypted with the sender' s public key and the 
72 
original message digest is revealed. The receiver rfi . 
a key on his/her copy of the message di:st or;: functiOn by in 
algonthm on both the hash function and the si . . Ic. ey performs Its own 
the message was not altered and kn th If It Is Identical, the receiver knows 
sender's private key.s ows at It could only have been encrypted with the 
. Under the American Bar Association guidelines6 there are thr . . . 
parties: the sender, receiver and the certificati . ' ee participatmg 
certification process creates a private and The sender or subscriber to the 
the certification authority The . te IC. ey. A copy of the public key is given to 
certification authority acts. as an diey Is kept secret by the subscriber. The 
receiver. The certification authority m between the sender/subscriber and the 
pair. Upon verification the cert· s . e identity and validity of the key 
name identifyin· ;_.,' . tfication authonty Issues a certificate with the subscriber's ' g uu.ormatton and the s b .b ' b . subscriber the party may th ' th ku sen er s pu he key· Once accepted by the • en use e ey · t di ·tal · certificates issued b the auth · 0 gt ly stgn the documents. All 
the subscriber.' y onty are placed on-line for receivers so that they can access 
Digital signatures allow parties to auth f . . 
enforceable online contracts and agr ts ICate and bmd parties rendering . eemen . tgnatures are val bl . furni . eVIdence of agreement; they are hard to for e· the . e m shirtg 
they constitute affirmati· f th . g.' document IS ongmal and authentic· on o e person stgrung to b b d d , indicating authorization of a transaction. e oun ; an they are efficient in 
Digital signatures would satisfy the Statut f F . 
not signed by the party to be charged WI.th e ? rauds, which makes agreements exceptions unenforceable c · customers would feel more secure t·n do· b . . . omparues and 
d · . mg usmess online knowin h th ealmg With. Stock traders would feel . g w om ey are 
be able to disclaim the purchase. • more comfortable m selling to clients who may not 
Problems Raised by the Use of Encryption and Digital Signatures 
A major problem is that encryption d d. ·tal . 
It is costly to train representatives ere tgi . are not free. 
procedures, and determine how to lidense a;_d estabhsh 
keys. A second problem is the many the 
is agreed upon by all state 
' ncryp ton may have limited application.9 
Federal Digital Signature Legislation 
Federal legislation is the solution to overco . th . . . 
July 4, 2000, President Clinton signed the e of state laws. On 
Commerce Act. Some state laws gi·ve WI.d d tgnatures m Global and National e ere ence to digital s· tur . are very restrictive. There is a need for a . I Igna e use, while other smgu ar standard. Such legislation should 
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allow non-fmancial institutions to use electronic authentication services and should allow 
use of electronic signatures online. 
The validity of electronic signatures, as set forth in § 101 of the statute states: 
(a) GENERAL RULE- With respect to any contract, agreement, or record 
entered into or provided in, or affecting, ·interstate or foreign 
commerce, notwithstanding any statute, regulation, or other rule of 
law, the legal effect, validity, or enforceability or such contract, 
agreement, or record shall not be denied-
( 1) on the ground that the contract, agreement, or record is not in 
writing if the contract, agreement, or record is an electronic 
record; or 
(2) on the ground that the contract, agreement, or record is not 
signed or is not affrrmed by a signature if the contract, 
agreement, or record is signed or affirmed by an electronic 
signature. 
The statute does not require the parties to use electronic means for agreements nor 
does it deny them the right to choose the type or method of electronic record or signature 
to utilize (§101(b)). If a state statute requires a record be provided in writing to a 
consumer, an electronic record would suffice provided the consumer has consented to 
such methodology by means of a "conspicuous and visually separate" consent, has been 
informed of the hardware and software requirements for access and retention of electronic 
records, and has been otherwise advised of the obligation to provide notifications be 
electronic means(§ 101(b)(2)). 
A state statute requiring that a contract, agreement, or record be retained will be 
met by an electronic record provided it is an accurate reflection of the information set 
forth in the written agreement and is accessible for the time required by state law. 
Requirements for the maintenance of originals, including checks, will suffice if the 
electronic record contains all of the relevant information (§101(2)(c)). 
Of particular importance to our discussion is § 1 02 of the Act concerning the right 
of a state to modify or supercede the within statute. The Act does permit a state to do so if 
the state statute, regulation, or rule of law: 
(l)(A) constitutes an enactment or adoption of the Uniform 
Electronic Transactions Act as reported to the State legislatures by the 
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws; or 
(B) specifies the alternative procedures or requirements for the use 
or acceptance (or both) of electronic records or electronic signatures to 
establish the legal effect, validity, or enforceability of contracts, 
agreements or records; and 
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(3) if enacted or adopted after the date of the enactment of this Act 
makes specific reference to this Act. ' 
The state i_f any, may discriminate in favor of or against a specific 
for authentication of electroruc records or specifies a specific type or size of 
entity engaged in business or is otherwise inconsistent with the Act. 
Article 2B of the UCC and UCITA ("Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act") 
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Law (NCCUSL) 
worked for about ten years to revise Article 2 of the UCC to cover electronic contracts. 
In of 1988, the Editorial Board of the UCC and the (NCCUSL) 
appomted a study group to Identify the problems that electronic exchanges were creating 
and recommend possible revisions to the UCC. In December of 1991, a drafting 
was created by the NCCUSL to revise Article 2(Sales) to preserve freedom of 
m contracts. In order to achieve this task, the 
Draftmg Comtn1ttee considered vanous alternatives to address the scope of electronic 
contracts. 10 Three of the alternatives are: 
(1 ) Defming the scope of Article 2 to include software license contracts in Article 
2, making adjustments Article 2 s7ctions to encompass the intangibles 
of transactwn, and adopting new sections in the 800 and 900 
senes to deal Wlth applicable licensing issues. 
(2) Adopting an "hub and spoke" configuration for Article 2 in which Article 2 
contains general principles applicable to all commercial contracts and have 
these apply to various sub-articles dealing with specific types of transactions 
as 2A (leases), Article B (sales), Article 2C (licenses). 
(3) Taking software contracts out of Article 2 and develop a new article of the UCC: 
Article 2B Licensing of Intangibles. 11 
In of_l995, the Executive Committee of the NCCUSL decided that the best 
to Article 2 to a article to address the issues involving digital 
info_rmatwn and n ghts m mtangible property. Accordingly, the American Law 
Institute and the Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws prepared 
a of an Article 2B of the Uniform Commercial Code, called "Software Contracts 
and Licenses of Information. " 12 The groups spent many years working to develop Article 2B. 
. About ten years ago, a Subcommittee of the American Bar Association began 
whether there a n7ed for a statute that would address the licensing 
transactwns. of computer information. The Subcommittee concluded that three was a 
need to clanfy these transactions and recommend to the NCCUSL that a uniform act be 
drafted. The NCCUSL agreed and appointed a Drafting Committee in the early 1990's. 
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Firstly, the UCITA Committee was merged into the UCC Drafting Committee for Article 
2. In 1995, the UCITA Committee was removed as a separate drafting committee and in 
1998 began drafting a separate uniform act. 13 
On April 7, 1999, the ALI and the NCCUSL that they would not 
recommend amending the UCC with Article 2B but were recommending the Uniform 
Computer Information Transactions Act (UCITA) for adoption by the states. They 
reached this conclusion because the Internet and Information Technology does not 
presently allow the kind of codification that is represented by the UCC. 14 The first state to 
adopt UCIT A was Virginia. 
The Uniform Computer lnformationTransactions Act 
UCITA applies to contracts to license or buy software, create computer programs 
online, access to databases and contracts to distribute information over the Internet. 
Proponents ofUCITA assert that the statute: 
• Provides for freedom to contract, 
• Supports commercial expansion 
• Permits federal intellectual property law to co-exist with state contrr.ct 
law, and 
• Permits the parties to opt in or out of the statute.'s 
Statutory Definitions 
A computer information transaction is "an agreement and the performance of that 
agreement to create, modify, transfer or license computer information or informational 
rights in computer information." 16 
Computer information is "information in electronic form that is obtained from or 
through the use of a computer or that is in digital or similar form capable of being 
processed by a computer." This term also includes an electronic copy of the information 
together with any documentation or packaging related to the copy. 
Items Not Covered by UCITA 
UCIT A excludes the following: 
1. Financial services transactions which are addressed by the Uniform Electronic 
Transactions Act(UETA) 
2. Contracts related to television, music and motion picture industry 
3. Compulsory licenses 
4. Employment contracts 
5. De minimus transactions. 
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Mixed Contractual Transactions and UCIT A 
A govern the entire contract if the primary purpose of the contract is 
informatlon. When UCITA is not the primary purpose of the contract, UCITA 
Will govern only the computer information portion of the agreement. UCITA does not 
apply to Articles 3, 4, 4A, 5, 6, 7, and 8 of the Uniform Commercial Code and Article 9 
governs if there are conflicts between the two statutes. 
Some UCIT A Provisions 
l!CIT A the formation of electronic contracts by electronic agents if they 
engage m operattons that confirm a contract. It can also be formulated if an individual 
takes an action and has reason to know that the ' action will cause the electronic agent to 
perform. 
UCITA does provide(s) the following remedies for licensors of Shrink-wrapped 
software agreements if the licensee doesn't have the chance to read all the terms of the 
shrink-wrapped license contract before paying: 
1. a full refund, 
2. reimbursement of reasonable expenses related to return, and/or 
3. payment for foreseeable losses caused by installation of the information. 
The warranties provided under UCIT A are similar to Article 2 as well as 
that .are with certain limitations. They reflect typical computer 
informatton constderattons such as infringement, integration, etc. 
UCITA Remedies 
The general rule is to give the aggrieved party the benefit of the contract if there is 
a breach; however, the aggrieved party must take reasonable measures to mitigate his/her 
damages. The most controversial of the remedies is electronic self-help. 
Pros and Cons ofUCITA 
. UCIT A is supported by the large computer related corporations such as: 
America Online and the Federal Reserve. Opponents of UCIT A 
educational institutions, consumer advocates, attorneys general, 
hbrary associatiOns, and msurance companies. 
Satisfying The Writing Requirement of the UCC 
One benefit that derived from the Article 2B proposals and incorporated into 
UCIT A was the change m the definition of a writing to include the maintenance of an 
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electronic record.'' It gives legal recognition to electronic records as writings as well as 
digital and electronic signatures. This change _to address issues created when the 
Statute of Frauds is invoked by a party to an act10n man electroruc contract case. 
Historically, oral contracts were enforceable under English law until 1677 when 
the Statute of Frauds and Perjuries was enacted by the British Parliament.18 In essence, 
the Statute provided that certain agreements had to be in writing, to wit: 
( 1) promise to answer for the debt of another; . . 
(2) agreement that by their tenor cannot be performed Within one year from the 
making thereof; 
(3) agreements made in consideration of marriage; 
(4) agreements concerning the sale of realty; 
( S) promise by an executor or administrator of a decedent's estate to pay estate 
indebtedness from his/her personal funds; 
(6) sale of goods whose price is $500 or more; and 
(7) miscellaneous other agreements as provided by state law. 
The difficulty presented by the Statute of Frauds is that a writing is required 
all of the above contracts thus rendering agreements not in accordance thereWith 
unenforceable. The writing must include the signature signed by the party to be charged. 
Does a digital signature conform to the Statute of Frauds? Without statutory amendments, 
digital signatures may not qualify. The Statute of Frauds says that the 
promise, or undertaking must be "subscribed by the party to be charged thereWith, or by 
his lawful agent ... "19 
The Statute of Frauds requires a signature but the term "signature: is broadly 
interpreted. The test is whether the person to the reasonably 
believed that the other party intended to authenticate the wntlng. Thus, Initials or other 
symbols may be sufficient. The sign or symbol can be anywhere on the not 
necessarily at the end thereto. The signature may be typed, stamped, or pnnted. The 
UCC 1-201 (39) states that "signed" includes "any symbol, executed or adopted by a 
party with present intention to authenticate a writing." 
In the absence of a broad interpretation by the courts as to admission of electronic 
terms and signatures under the Statute of Frauds, it would appear that to 
existing statutory requirements would be necessary. The U.S. could Enghs_h law 
which abolished the Statute of Frauds for most contracts that reqUired . a 
writing or the Statute can be amended to permit a statutory exception for electroruc 
contracts. A modification of the Statute's requirements was instituted by the _enactment of 
the Uniform Commercial Code, Article 2-201 which contains the requrrement a 
writing for the purchase or sale of goods $500 or more also has a number of exceptions 
• th . 21 not applicable to the Statute s o er sections. 
It appears from the exceptions created by the enactment of the UCC 
centuries later that scholars are uneasy about rendering unenforceable contracts lacking 
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the requirements of a writing. Historically, prior to the 1677 Statute writings were 
unnecessary because most inhabitants were illiterate. With the post-World War II 
enactment of the Uniform Commercial Code, the addition of several major exceptions to 
the requirement of a writing indicated a desire by the drafters to be more in accord with 
the realities of the marketplace. The new realities of cyberspace and the multitude of 
contracts of purchase and sales now taking place illustrate the need to create a new 
regime for Internet contracts. One may seriously question whether the Statute protects 
against fraud or permits fraud by allowing a person wishing to avoid a contract to raise 
the lack of writing defense.22 
Another advantage of the provisions set forth in_the suggested Article 2B may be 
found in a number of proposed sections thereto. For example, Section 2B-203A(a) would 
mimic Section 2-207(1) of the UCC Sales Article by permitting acceptance of an offer for 
Internet services "even if the acceptance contains terms that vary from the terms of the 
offer, unless the acceptance materially conflicts with material term of the offer or 
materially varies from the terms of the offer.'>n Section 2B-204 discusses the rules for 
automated transactions. It explicitly permits the formation of a contract if the interaction 
by the electronic agents "results in the electronic agents' engaging in operations that 
confirm or indicate the existence of a contract unless the operations resulted from 
electronic mistake, fraud and the like." 
A contract may be formed in any manner showing agreement including by offer 
and acceptance, conduct of the parties, and/or operations of electronic agents recognizing 
the existence of a contract. Such agreement may be established even in the absence of the 
determination of when the agreement was entered into, or if one or more terms are left 
open but such terms can be reasonably ascertained. If there is a material disagreement in 
the absence of contrary conduct, then the contract is not formed.14 Assent is manifested to 
a record or term in electronic contracts by authenticating the record or term, by conduct 
or statements indicating assent, or circumstances show assent by an electronic agent.15 
Shrinkwrap license agreements [discussed below] are enforceable under Section 2B-
208(a) unless they are unconscionable or other unenforceable.16 
Damages in electronic contracts to a licensor by a licensee would include sums 
not to exceed the contract fee and the market value of other consideration required for 
performance under the contract. They include accrued and unpaid contract fees, the 
market value of other consideration earned but not received, consequential and incidental 
damages, and "damages calculated in any reasonable manner.'.,, 
Does the Legal Reasoning Applicable to Click Wrap/Shrink-Wrap Licenses 
Control in Electronic Contracts? 
Is the act of entering a credit card number and clicking acceptance of purchase 
sufficient to make a purchaser liable under terms and conditions set out on the screen in 
an unreadable form or which are declared after the purchase ? Perhaps the legal 
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reasoning that was promulgated in deciding shrink-wrap license cases will provide a 
possible direction for electronic cases. 
An on-going issue in which courts have decided in opposition to each is the 
le ality of shrink-wrap licenses. We are all familiar with the packages ensconced m clear 
pl!stic cellophane wrappers containing the familiar notice: 
Before you open this package: Carefully read the following 
legal agreement regarding your use of the enclosed 
By the act of opening the sealed package, usmg the 
software or permitting its use, you will indicate your full 
consent to the terms and conditions of this agreement. If 
you don't agree with what it says, you return the 
software package within 7 days of your rece1pt for a full 
refund. 
Thereafter, a highly extensive, small print restrictive notice the Such 
notice constitutes what is euphemistically is called a shrink-wrap hcense or 
agreement.28 It is on most software packages. The difficulty is that most 
purchase the product often unaware of the restrictions being imposed upon them until 
they have unwrapped the package. The notice is often repeated on screen when the user 
inserts the CD-ROM unto the hard drive. How legal is it to compel and users 
of goods containing such notices to comply with the post-purchase restnctions. 
At first blush such notices may be superfluous inasmuch as software pr?grams are 
protected by the copyright laws that restrict and/or 
distribution of the programs. The leading cases discussmg the are. IJ9CD. 
Incorporated v. Matthew Zeidenberg and Silken Mountain Web Servrces, I30. and Step-Saver Data Systems, Inc. v. Wyse Technology and the Software Link, Inc. 
In PROCD the plaintiff compiled a computer database containing some 3,000 
telephone directorles. The database is sold under the trademark label 
users on CD-ROM discs. The license agreement is seen as soon as the packagmg 1s 
unwrapped. A copyrighted application program permits the user to search the database for 
the telephone number of the person named by the user. The plaintiff spent some $10 
million to compile and keep current the database. The database costs about 1 SO to 
purchasers thereof. The resale or other dissemination of the product was thus 
the licensing agreement when the package was opened as well as set forth on liDtlal 
application of the software. 
The defendant, Zeidenberg, bought the software and decided to ignore 
restrictive notice by reselling the information under his corporation, 
Web Services, Inc. The price charged was less than that charged by the plamtiff. _'Nhen 
the plaintiff sued for an injunction and other relief, the lower court that the hcense 
was not enforceable because the terms were not outside of the packagmg. 
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The Court of Appeals reversed. Defendant's claim was that the package on the 
store's shelf was an offer that a person accepts by buying the product. It noted that the 
length of the license and other terms would preclude their exhibition on the box cover 
unless they were printed microscopically. A notice on the outside of the box that the sale 
is subject to a license with terms detailed on the inside with a right to return the purchase 
sufficed to protect the licensor. Purchases of goods before communication of detailed 
terms is made are common. For example, insurance purchases are made without a reading 
of the policy that follows after the purchase. Ditto for purchases of airline tickets. Tickets 
for shows have restrictions either on the rear of the ticket and/or at the theatre as to 
recording and use of cameras. Drugs and appliances have detailed warnings and other 
information within the box that is not opened until after the purchase. 
The Court then addressed whether UCC section 2-201 precluded the holding 
herein. The lower Court felt that inasmuch as a new UCC section 2-2203 has been 
proposed to validate shrink-wrap licenses, then the existing section would not so validate. 
The Court stated that those changes in wording did not necessarily change the meaning of 
the prior statute but may have fortified or clarified the statute. The Court distinguished 
three other shrink-wrap cases31 by stating that the issues therein concerned battle-of-the-
forms and not the main issue in the within action. 
The appropriate section according to the Court is UCC 2-204(1) which states that 
"A contract for sale of goods may be made in any manner sufficient to show agreement, 
including conduct by both parties which recognizes the existence of such a contract." 
Thus, a vendor may invite acceptance by conduct and can interpose limitations on what 
constitutes acceptance. The UCC explicitly allows contracts to be formed in other ways. 
Such is the case at hmd. The defendant was displayed the license agreement on opening 
the package md on viewing the screen. 
Moreover, UCC section 2-206 governing acceptance further reinforces the 
plaintiff's position. It states that a buyer accepts goods by failing to make an effective 
rejection after having had an opportunity to inspect them. The defendant inspected the 
package, used the software, saw the license, and failed to reject the goods. 
The Court disposed of the alleged contradictory holding of the U.S. Supreme 
Court in Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co. 32 that held a sirlgle 
alphabetical telephone directory was not original and therefore was not entitled to 
copyright protection. 33 In the within case, the defendant was precluded by contract if not 
by the Copyright Law to duplicate the information contained in the CD ROM. 
In the Step-Saver action, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit came to a 
different conclusion. In. 1981, Step-Saver developed a program combining hardware and 
software to satisfy word processing and other purposes for use by physicians md 
attorneys based on the IBM personal computer system. It selected a program by the 
defendant TSL as the operating system and terminals manufactilred by Wyse to 
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accomplish its purposes. After having done so, the Company received many complaints 
from customers and sued Wyse and TSL seeking indemnity with respect to lawsuits 
instituted against it by customers. The plaintiff, Step-Saver alleged breach of warranties 
by Wyse and TSL. The trial court dismissed as against TSL holding that the box-top 
license disclaimed all express and implied warranties. 
The box-top licenses stated that the customer did not purchase the software but 
only a personal, non-transferable license to use the [program; that all expressed and 
implied warranties were disclaimed; that the sole remedy was to return the defective disk 
for replacement and that all damages were disclaimed; that the license was the final and 
complete expression of the parties' agreement' and that opening the package indicated an 
acceptance of the above terms and conditions. If the user did not agree, the purchase 
could be returned within fifteen days of purchase and all monies would be returned. 
With respect to the effect of the box-top license that the plaintiff alleged did not 
become a part of the contract because it was a material alteration and that the license was 
not intended to be a final and complete expression of the terms of the agreement, the 
Court of Appeals stated that UCC section 2-207 was applicable. The section provides: 
Additional Terms in Acceptance or Confirmation. 
(1) A definite and seasonable expression of acceptance or a 
written confirmation which is sent within a reasonable time 
operates as an acceptance even though it states terms 
additional or different from those offered or agreed upon, 
unless acceptance is expressly made conditional on assent 
to the additional or different terms. 
(2) The additional terms are to be construed as proposals 
for addition to the contract. Between merchants such terms 
become part of the contract unless: 
(a) the offer expressly limits acceptance to the terms of 
the offer, 
(b) they materially alter it, or 
(c) notification of objection to them has already been 
given or is given within a reasonable time after notice 
of them is received. 
(3) Conduct by both parties which recognizes the 
existence of a contract is sufficient to establish a 
contract for sale although the writings of the parties 
do not otherwise establish a contract. In such a case 
the terms of the particular contract consist of those 
terms on which the writings of the parties agree, 
together with any supplementary terms incorporated 
under any other provision of the Act." 
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The Court stated that Section 2-207 attempts to distinguish between standard 
terms in a form confirmation that a party wishes the Court to incorporate in the event of a 
dispute and the actual terms understood by the parties as governing the agreement. The 
burden is upon the party asking the court to enforce its form to determine that a particular 
clause was a part of the contract. In applying this test, the Court said that the consent by 
opening provision did not make Step-Saver's acceptance conditional. When a person has 
gone through the effort of making a purchase, "the purchaser has made a decision to buy 
a particular product and has actually obtained the product, the purchaser may use it 
despite the refund offer, regardless of the additional terms specified after the contract 
formed [at p. 34)." There was no evidence to show that TSL would have refused to sell if 
Step-Saver had not consented to the restrictive terms. The Court thus held that the box-
top license did not contain the complete and final expression of the terms of the parties' 
agreement. 
The difference in the two decisions may lie in the refusal of both courts to become 
parties to actions by defendants to evade responsibility for errant actions. In the ProCD 
case, the defendant converted the effort of the plaintiff in amassing data requiring the 
expenditure of millions of dollars and significant time to integrate telephone listing from 
many hundreds of sources. In the Step-Saver case, the defendant sought to prevent 
liability accruing to it for defective performances as to leave the plaintiff in the position 
of being responsible for its unsatisfactory performance. It would appear, however, that 
shrink-wrap licenses will be enforceable provided they are not unreasonable, particularly 
in consumer transactions. 
Click-Wrap Agreements 
Click-wrap agreements are similar to shrink-wrap licenses. The user generally 
opens a new program being installed on a computer or where the program was initially 
installed on a new computer and is faced with an agreement to which the user is given the 
choice of agreeing or not agreeing with the contents. The program will not open unless 
consent by clicking on the box containing the words "I agree" or similar wording to the 
terms on the agreement is given. The question again is whether such agreements are valid 
and enforceable against the user. 
In Crispi v. Microsoft Network. L.L.C., 323 N.J. Super. 118 (N.J. App. Div., 
1999), the New Jersey Appellate Court upheld the trial court's determination that such 
consent by a user becomes a binding contract. The Court also upheld the forum selection 
clause contained in the agreement that compels all lawsuits arising out of the contract to 
take place in Kings County, in the State of Washington. Thus, the result of the case is that 
a person purchasing and using Microsoft programs may have to travel to the State of 
Washington to sue or defend a lawsuit for an alleged breach of the agreement consented 
to which agreement becomes known only after one opens the program. 
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A similar result took place in Geoffv. A.O.L., File No. C.A. No. PC 97-0331, 
1998 (R.I. Sup. Ct., 1998), wherein the Court upheld an agreement that a subscriber to 
America Online's Internet service had to consent to before the service could be accessed. 
The Court said that a person who signs an agreement by clicking onto the "I agree" 
button cannot later complain that the agreement was not read or understood. 
The Uniform Electronic Transfers Act 
In July of 1999, the NCCUSL approved the Uniform Electronic Transfers Act 
("UET A") for submission to the states for adoption. This process was underway for three 
years compared with the more than ten years that were spent working on the revisions to 
the UCC and ended with the adoption ofUCITA about the same time. 
The importance of the UET A is that congress specifically refers to the Electronic 
Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act as an exception to the Act's mandate. 
The key provision of the Act is Section 7, Legal Recognition of Electronic Records, 
Electronic Signatures, and Electronic Contracts, which states: 
(a) A record or signature may not be denied legal effect or enforceability 
solely because it is in electronic form. 
(b) A contract may not be denied legal effect or enforceability solely 
because an electronic record was used in its formation. 
(c) If a law requires a record to be in writing, an electronic record satisfies 
the law. 
(d) If a law requires a signature, an electronic signature satisfies the law. 
The Act applies to electronic records and signatures relating to a transaction 
connected to a business, commercial and governmental affairs. It is broader that Article 
2B and USCIT A inasmuch as it is not limited to licensing agreements and covers the 
transactions in Article 2 of the UCC. By adopting the UET A, states need not be 
concerned with an expansive definition of a writing nor need it adopt the controversial 
Article 2B. Thus, it appears that states have a variety of choices in the legislative scheme 
they wish to adopt. The clear mandate is that an electronic record may no longer be 
denied legal effect. 
CONCLUSION 
The world of technology is transforming the marketplace (so as) to make global 
purchases as easy as going to a nearby shopping mall. In order to enable buyers and.sellers of 
goods using the ever improving electronic marketing technology to engage m global 
purchases, the rules of the game have to keep pace. Contracts over the Internet are but one 
area of law that has to be greatly modified. Because the technology is changing at such a 
rapid pace, legal protections must be rapidly updated to keep current with the technology. 
Congressional enactments in diverse areas concerning the Internet have taken place as to 
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intellectual property rights, cybercrime and the like. Similar developments in cybercontracts 
are now taking shape. We have discussed a few of the issues being addressed at this time. 
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